Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “Algorithmic Cheap Talk”. Submitted to EC ’24. Presented at The Technion Game Theory Seminar and The Technion TCS Lunch. [arXiv]
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem”. Submitted to EC ’24. [arXiv]
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “A Random Dictator Is All You Need” / “Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions”. Proceedings of The 24th ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2023 (extended abstract); under R&R in AEJ:Microeconomics. Additional presentations: The 2023 Israel AGT Day (recorded presentation); The 12th Annual Conference of the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society; The Workshop on Algorithms, Learning, and Games – ALGA 2023; and The 9th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice – COMSOC-2023. [arXiv] [Poster] [Slides]
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion”. Proceedings of The 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS), 2022 (extended abstract); under submission to Games and Economic Behavior. Additional presentations: The 7th Highlights of Algorithms (HALG 2022) conference; WALE 2022 – Workshop on Algorithms for Learning and Economics (poster). [arXiv] [Poster] [Full slides] [Shortened slides]
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion”. Games and Economic Behavior. 2022 Nov 1;136:226-48; and Proceedings of The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2021 (extended abstract). Additional presentations: The 8th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice – COMSOC-2021 (poster); The 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster); The 2021 INFORMS Annual Meeting. [arXiv] [Poster] [Slides]
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi. “Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints”. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. [arXiv] [Poster] [Slides]